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I. The Dual Origins of "Influence Districts" 
THE QUESTIONS OF how or whether courts should shape electoral 
structures in order to maximize the "influence" of members of minor-
ity groups are not new. In his dissent in Allen v. Board of Elections, 1 the 
first case in which the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Vot-
ing Rights Act to apply to electoral structures, Justice John Marshall 
Harlan declared that "it is not clear to me how a court would go about 
deciding whether an at-large system is to be preferred over a district sys-
tem. Under one system, Negroes have some influence in the election of 
all officers; under the other, minority groups have more influence in the 
selection of fewer officers."2 Whatever the situation in 1969, after the 
1982 amendments to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, there is no 
doubt that Congress has decided that the standard should be that minor-
ity voters should have a fair opportunity to elect candidates of their 
choice--that is, to determine the choice regardless of the desires of ma-
jorities of majority group voters--and that district systems protect that 
right better than at-large systems.3 That does not, however, entirely ex-
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haust the force of Harlan's criticism. What about the case in which 
members of a group cannot form a "political majority"?4 Should courts 
intervene to pool geographically compact minority group members into 
one or a few districts, or to stop redistricters from fragmenting them? Or 
should courts decide, in effect, that the groups are too small to have any 
cognizable rights, such that they will have to make their own way 
through the political thicket? In the extreme, does a group that makes 
up 49.9% of a "political majority" deserve no special protection as a 
"discrete and insular minority"5 under the Voting Rights Act or the 
United States Constitution, while a group that comprises 50.1% does? 
This would certainly be a concept of "group rights" with a vengeance, 
protecting larger groups, which presumably have a greater ability to take 
care of themselves through normal politics, more than it protects'smaller 
groups, which are more at the mercy of majorities. 6 
There is also another, more practical, political origin to the influence 
district problem. For many years, those who drew reapportionment 
plans have been compressing minority communities into a small number 
of districts ("packing") or spreading them thinly into a large number of 
districts ("stacking") depending on the demography of the area and the 
objectives of the planners. In the post-Reynolds v. Sims 7 reapportion-
ment in California in 1965, for example, the heavily Latino area of East 
Los Angeles was cut into nine state assembly and six congressional dis-
tricts. Had the boundaries been drawn differently, Latinos would proba-
bly have been able to determine the elections of some officials. Once the 
"control" seats were drawn, if the remaining parts of the area had been 
combined, Latinos would have been able to influence the election of other 
4. This problematic term is left undefined for the time being. Problems with this con-
cept are discussed in part III, infra. Courts have recognized the concept, but left it undefined. 
See Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1401-03, 1410 & n.l3 (7th Cir. 1984) (discussing "effec-
tive majority"). 
5. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
6. The plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,78-79 (1980), asserts 
that the Court's decisions have squarely rejected a right to group representation. During Sen-
ate hearings on the renewal of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, many conservative witnesses 
decried the recognition of "group voting rights." See Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 53. S. 
I 761. S. 1975. S. 1992. and H.R. 3 I I 2 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1351-54 (1982) (statement of James F. Blum-
stein, Professor, Vanderbilt University Law School); id. at 509-10 (statement of Dr. Edward J. 
Erler, National Humanities Center); id. at 231 (statement of Walter Berns, Professor, Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute). Opponents of giving minorities the right to elect candidates of thetr 
choice, such as Judge G . Thomas Eisele, still harshly decry the concept of "group rights." See 
Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 229 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (Eisele, J., concurring and dissent-
ing), and Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 626 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (Eisele, J., dissenting). 
7. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
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officials very markedly, though perhaps not decisively. Before recent 
trends in voting rights law, white politicians often split up concentrations 
of minority groups and advised them to be satisfied with diffuse influence. 
Now, some courts are telling them to be satisfied with whatever highly 
concentrated districts, if any, can be drawn, because the law does not 
protect against the fragmentation of minority-minority groups (i.e., mi-
nority groups that do not form a majority of the population in an area). 8 
Is this not a continuation of a slightly diminished discrimination in an-
other guise? 
Any proposal for a legal stance on the question of influence districts 
should continue the dominant line of tradition of Congress and the 
courts, rather than contravene it. Therefore, Part II of this Article traces 
the "practical" or "pragmatic" tradition in voting rights law from the 
passage of the Reconstruction Constitutional Amendments9 through the 
1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act and the nearly simultane-
ously issued United States Supreme Court decision in Rogers v. Lodge. 10 
Beginning in 1870, Congress, and later the courts, rejected an abstract, 
formulaic, "bright line" approach to voting rights law except during the 
period of massive discrimination and disfranchisement. Both Congress 
and the Supreme Court went beyond protecting the bare right of mem-
bers of minority groups to vote. Instead, they realized that to cast an 
effective vote, African-Americans and others had to be sheltered from 
violence, intimidation, and fraud, and they had to be free to speak and 
organize. In the 1940s, courts insisted on nondiscrimination in prima-
ries, and in the late 1960s, they helped guarantee the right to be free of 
recently established discriminatory electoral structures. 
The courts and Congress refused to accept two proffered bright 
lines: one drawn, in effect, between voting per se and everything else, 
and the other guaranteeing proportional representation. Rather, they 
adopted the less precise, but more nuanced "totality of the circum-
stances" test for proving both intent and effect. 
Part III of this Article discusses the three-pronged test outlined in 
Thornburg v. Gingles. 11 Even though Gingles is sometimes interpreted to 
imply that courts do not need to pay attention to minority groups who 
cannot form effective majorities of electoral districts, Justice Brennan's 
opinion in Gingles specifically refuses to foreclose that question. Both 
the logic of the opinion and contemporary political experience contra-
8. McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988). 
9. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, and XV. 
10. 458 u.s. 613 (1982). 
11. 478 u.s. 30 (1986). 
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vene the alleged implication. More specifically, it is wrong for courts to 
isolate the first prong of the Gingles test from the other two. Viewed as 
interconnected, the three parts of the test do not preclude a consideration 
of the question of influence districts. Indeed, election data from both 
hypothetical and actual examples demonstrates that there is no possible 
theoretical division between influence districts and control districts. Part 
III concludes that there is no bright line in Gingles. 
Part IV looks briefly at some federal court opinions concerning in-
fluence districts, concentrating on Garza v. County of Los Angeles,12 Ar-
mour v. Ohio, 13 and McNeil v. Springfield Park District.14 The diverse 
analyses and criticisms of these cases suggest two different, but more sys-
tematic approaches to the influence district problem-a "results" ap-
proach and an "intent" approach-which are discussed in Part V. The 
analysis of both approaches concentrates on the totality of the circum-
stances standard, in line with the pragmatic tradition, the intent of Con-
gress in extending and amending the Voting Rights Act in 1982, and the 
Supreme Court's decisions in White v. Regester" and Rogers v. Lodge.16 
Finally, Part V attempts to respond generally to criticisms of protecting 
the interests of small minority groups. It concludes that both the value 
of bright line standards and the dangers of relaxing them have been 
exaggerated. 
II. The Pragmatic Tradition in Voting Rights Law 
A. The Reconstruction Enforcement Acts 
The dominant tradition in voting rights law in American history has 
been practical and flexible, not formalistic and formulaic. It has been a 
tradition of equity, not of law.17 
In their most cramped construction, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments might be held to protect nothing more than the bare right 
to cast a ballot. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
refer to voting at all, while that of the Fifteenth Amendment only states 
that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
12. 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
13. 775 F . Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
14. 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988). 
IS. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
16. 458 u.s. 613 (1982). 
17. On the equity tradition in American law, see PETER C. HOFFER, THE LAW'S CON· 
SCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA (1990). 
Spring 199 3] INFLUENCE DISTRJCTS sss 
color, or previous condition of servitude."18 The Radical Republican 
Congresses that passed these Amendments, however, were well aware 
that an effective ballot required much more than just the abstract right to 
attend the polls and cast it. Violence or fraud could prevent people from 
voting or nullify the result. Denial of the right to speak or organize 
could undermine political activity and render voting meaningless. With-
out protection of such rights, the ballot would become merely an empty 
abstraction, not a practical means for former slaves and white Unionists 
to protect themselves. 
Accordingly, Congress passed a series of three Enforcement Acts in 
1870 and 1871, the first coming within three months of the ratification of 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 19 The Act of May 31, 1870,20 not only made 
it a misdemeanor for election officials and others to deny placks the right 
to vote, but also attempted to combat the Ku Klux Klan and similar 
groups by declaring that violence or conspiracy to deny anyone the right 
to vote was a felony punishable by a fine of up to $5000 and a maximum 
of ten years in prison. Recognizing that widespread terrorism would tax 
the existing skeletal federal enforcement machinery, the forty-first Con-
gress increased the number of court commissioners and authorized, if 
necessary, the use of federal troops to protect voting. Fraud was made 
illegal, and candidates who lost because of racially discriminatory actions 
could seek injunctive relief in federal courts. 
The Supervisory Act of February 28, 1871,21 provided for close fed-
eral regulation of registration and ballot counting to strengthen the pro-
tections against fraud and the denial of the vote throughout all stages of 
the electoral process. If two citizens of any city whose population ex-
ceeded 20,000 requested an election supervisor, the judge of the federal 
court containing that city had to appoint such a supervisor. The supervi-
sor, with special deputy marshals at his disposal, was authorized to scru-
tinize every aspect of voting, from registration, through possible 
intimidation, to counting the votes. Thus, instead of issuing a detailed 
list of invalid practices, thereby inviting Klansmen and political manipu-
lators to invent new methods of nullifying the rights of citizens, Congress 
authorized the appointment of a quasi-judicial administrator with the 
power and authority to deal with techniques of discrimination and chi-
canery that Congress might not have thought of or included in its inven-
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XV,§ 1. 
19. See THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1870, at 509-15 
(Harold M. Hyman ed., 1967). 
20. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870). 
21. Ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871). 
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tory. During the next two decades, the testimony of federal election 
supervisors was often crucial in unseating fraudulently elected Southern 
members of Congress. 
Less than two months later, the forty-second Congress attempted to 
protect the right of free speech by declaring it a crime to use force or 
threats to prevent voters from "giving his support or advocacy in a law-
ful manner towards or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified 
person as an elector of President or Vice-President of the United States, 
or as a member of the Congress of the United States, or to injure any 
such citizen in his person or property on account of such support or 
advocacy . .. . " 22 To the Reconstruction Congresses, the still-powerful 
injunction against intruding on the rights of the states bad to give way to 
the attempt to practically protect the right of individuals and groups to 
vote. 
B. From the White Primary to the Voting Rights Act 
For many years, from United States v. Reese 23 and United States v. 
Cruikshank 24 through Giles v. Harris 2 s and beyond, the Supreme Court 
abandoned its practical tradition-and blacks were disfranchised and 
then denied legal recourse.26 The white primary case, Smith v. All-
wright,21 marked a return to the original practical spirit of the Recon-
struction Congresses. 28 In Smith, the Supreme Court brushed aside the 
contention that the Democratic Party was a private group that could set 
its own membership criteria, and therefore, the restriction of its primary 
to whites did not represent "state action."29 As everyone realized, but as 
previous Supreme Court decisions had disingenuously refused to recog-
nize,30 in Texas at such time, the Democratic primary was not merely an 
integral part of the electoral process, it was the only election that mat-
tered. Attempts to evade Smith by repealing state election laws in South 
22. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
23. 92 u.s. 214 (1 875). 
24. 92 u.s. 542 (1875). 
25. 189 u.s. 475 (1903). 
26. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CON· 
TROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 135, 160-62 
(Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter The Two Reconstructions); J . 
Morgan Kousser, How to Determine Intent: Lessons from LA., 7 J.L. & PoL. 591, 688-89 
( 1991). 
27. 321 u.s. 649 ( 1944). 
28. For an excellent historical treatment of Smith, see DARLENE C. HINE, BLACK VIC· 
TORY: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WHITE PRIMARY IN TEXAS {1979). 
29. 321 U.S. at 664-65. 
30. E.g., Gro vey v. Townsend. 295 U.S. 45 (1935). 
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Carolina31 and requiring a pledge of allegiance to white supremacy in 
Alabama32 were struck down by lower federal courts. 
The Supreme Court strode deeper into the political thicket in Gomil-
lion v. Lightfoot.33 To counteract rising black voter registration in the 
county that had the highest proportion of African-Americans in the 
country, the Alabama state legislature cut the town of Tuskegee into an 
"uncouth 28-sided figure" that excluded all but four or five blacks from 
the town limits. Despite Justice Felix Frankfurter's reluctance to involve 
the Court in political matters, a reluctance that delayed the reapportion-
ment decisions for nearly a generation,34 he was so outraged by the Tus-
kegee gerrymander that he discarded his abstract principles and faced the 
practical problem of vote dilution. Black votes, Frankfurter and the 
other justices realized, were useless if discriminatory redistricting denied 
them influence in elections. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was both the strongest protection of 
the right to vote ever enacted into federal law and the strongest illustra-
tion of the pragmatic tradition in voting rights law. I t did not merely 
suspend the literacy test and authorize the appointment of federal voting 
registrars, the provisions that attracted the most attention at first. Like 
the forty-first and forty-second Congresses, the eighty-ninth Congress re-
alized that Southern states would invent ingenious schemes to circum-
vent the intent of the law, and in both Reconstructions, new, quasi-
judicial administrative officers were created to prevent those evasions. 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required all state and local legal 
changes related to elections in "covered jurisdictions" to be submitted for 
preclearance to the United States Department of Justice in Washington. 
But what was a "covered jurisdiction"? Recognizing that it lacked the 
staff to supervise the whole country, as well as the fact that the worst 
problems of disfranchisement were concentrated in a few Deep South 
states, Congress established a criterion combining the use of a literacy 
test and a level of voter turnout in a particular presidential election that 
bad the vice of seeming jerry-built, but the virtue of targeting the Deep 
South. 35 Once again, the Congress discarded tidiness and abstractions in 
favor of practical results. 
31. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947). 
32. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949). 
33. 364 u.s. 339 (1960). 
34. See. e.g .• Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
35. STEVEN F . LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, 
at 312-13 (1976). 
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C. From Jackson, Mississippi, to Burke County, Georgia, with a 
Side Trip to Mobile, Alabama 
Allen v. Board of Elections 36 affirmed the spirit of section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act and closed off an avenue of evasion in covered juris-
dictions. To mitigate the effect of an increase in the proportion of blacks 
registered to vote from 7% to nearly 60% in the years immediately fol-
lowing the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the state of Mississippi 
changed the mode of election of many local governing bodies from dis-
trict to at-large and made other offices appointive, instead of elective. 
Contending that these laws had nothing to do with "voting," and that 
the Voting Rights Act was designed only to allow blacks to cast a ballot, 
not to regulate electoral systems, Mississippi denied that it was legally 
required to submit these legal changes to Washington.n ·Not only did 
the Supreme Court reject the state's argument, but it also stated the pur-
pose and scope of the Voting Rights Act in the most far-reaching terms. 
The Act "was aimed at the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regula-
tions which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because 
of their race. " 38 Section 5 required preclearance of any state law "which 
altered the election law of a covered State in even a minor way."39 A 
year later, Congress in effect affirmed the Court's interpretation of the 
Act when it fully extended section 5.40 No one in the Nixon Administra-
tion or in Congress made any serious effort to question the Allen deci-
sion-in stark contrast with the actions of the civil rights community a 
decade later, after the City of Mobile v. Bolden case.41 
It is ironic that the first full-blown at-large election case that the 
Supreme Court heard came not from a Southern state, but from a North-
em state. In Whitcomb v. Chavis,42 a case where multi-member state 
legislative districts in Indianapolis, Indiana, were challenged, the Court 
said it was not enough for plaintiffs to contend that an electoral system 
denied blacks proportional representation. Instead, they must show 
"that ghetto residents had less opportunity than did other Marion 
County residents to participate in the political processes and to elect leg-
36. 393 u.s. 544 (1969). 
37. On the Mississippi laws, see FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL 
EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI AFTER 1965 (1990). 
38. Allen. 393 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added). 
39. ld. at 566. 
40. See PARKER. supra note 37, at 180.82. 
41. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). For a further discussion of Allen and the point made in the text, 
see The Two Reconstructions, supra note 26, at 171-73. 
42. 403 u.s. 124 (1971). 
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islators of their choice."43 This "participate and elect" standard, first 
enunciated in Chavis, went beyond Mississippi's contention in Allen, 
which would have guaranteed only a very limited right to participate, 
and stopped short of adopting a mechanical proportional representation 
rule, which would have provided a very bright line. Had either the Court 
in Chavis, or later the Congress, in considering renewal of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1981-82, adopted such a standard, the tasks of judges and 
lawyers would have been much easier: when confronted with an alleg-
edly discriminatory electoral system, they would compare the proportion 
of minority electors with that of minority officeholders; if the first ex-
ceeds the second, the plaintiffs win; if not, the defendants win.44 Anyone 
who abjures less specific criteria in voting rights cases as messy and 
vague must justify the rejection of the extremely simple, manifestly judi-
cially manageable standard of proportional representation. 
Rather than adopt the proportionality criterion, the Supreme Court 
chose to remain flexible, enunciating a "totality of the circumstances" 
test in its unanimous decision in the 1973 Texas case of White v. 
Regester.4s The Court concluded that multi-member legislative districts 
in Dallas and Bexar County illegally discriminated against African-
Americans and Latinos, while the Indiana districts did not. This differ-
ence was due to a series of different factors that were present and proven 
in Texas, but that had not been demonstrated in Indiana.46 In Dallas, 
there was a notable and notorious history of discrimination. Candidates 
had to run for numbered places and win by a majority vote. Elections 
were practically controlled by a white slating group, and were often char-
acterized by blatant racial appeals. In San Antonio, Latinos suffered 
from a history of discrimination and a markedly unresponsive govern-
ment, and they faced language barriers. The precedent of White was 
codified in the appeals court case of Zimmer v. McKeithen.41 The 
"White-Zimmer factors" concentrated on the effect of discrimination and 
dominated voting rights law for several years. Providing a general gui-
dance scheme for organizing evidence, not an abstract, mechanical bright 
line test, the White-Zimmer factors were squarely in the main line of the 
voting rights tradition. 
43. !d. at 149. 
44. The number of seats on the governing body must also be taken into account. The 
extra minority proportion, rounded off, must be equal to the proportion that one member of 
the governing body represents. 
45. 412 u.s. 755 (1973). 
46. !d. at 765-70. 
47. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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The plurality opinion in the 1980 Supreme Court case of City of 
Mobile v. Bolden 48 gave non-bright line standards a bad name.49 Selec-
tively reinterpreting past court decisions, Justice Potter Stewart an-
nounced that the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment 
harbored a previously unnoticed intent requirement.~ The requirement, 
moreover, could not be satisfied by proving the White-Zimmer factors, 51 
and Stewart did not indicate what would satisfy him. 52 Over the strenu-
ous dissent of Justice Byron White, who had written not only White v. 
Regester, but also the Court's initial decision on intent in the 1970s, 
Washington v. Davis,53 Justice Stewart examined the evidence from Mo-
bile piece by piece and proclaimed that no single part of the evidence had 
proven a discriminatory purpose. 54 Four justices disagreed. 55 The prob-
lem with Bolden was that it discarded the "totality of the circumstances" 
test and put nothing in its place. It was a soft wall or wavering line of 
demarcation. 
The civil rights community and law school critics exploded. The 
Bolden decision was almost unanimously denounced, and the community 
took the occasion of the 1982 expiration of section 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act to lobby intensively and extensively for a congressional overturning 
of Justice Stewart's opinion and a return to the White-Zimmer factors. 
In a rebuke to the Reagan Administration, Congress overwhelmingly 
lined up with the critics, as the much strengthened Act passed the House, 
by a margin of 389-24, and the Senate, 85-8. The extensive hearings and 
committee reports reverberated with condemnations of Bolden, and the 
authoritative Senate Report No. 417 specifically endorsed and enumer-
ated the "Zimmer factors."56 
48. 446 u.s. 55 (1980). 
49. Of course. an intent requirement had been criticized before. See the trenchant and, 
for a time, prophetic, criticisms of Judge John Minor Wisdom in his concurrence in Nevett v. 
Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 231-34 (5th Cir. 1978). 
SO. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62-6S. 
51. /d. at 72-74. 
52. In Neveu v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978), which was decided along with 
Bolden, Judge Gerald B. Tjoftat interpreted Zimmer as an intent case and treated its factors as 
providing circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory purpose. /d. at 215, 222. Justice Stew-
art could have simply followed Judge Tjoftat's lead, as Justice White did, in effect, in Rogers v. 
Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
53. 426 u.s. 229 (1976). 
54. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 73-74. 
55. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented separately. /d. at 94-141. Justice 
Blackmun thought that a discriminatory purpose was proven, but thought that District Court 
Judge Virgtl Pittman's remedy had gone too far. /d. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the 
result). 
56. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28·29 (1982). 
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Before the revised Act passed, but after it had become clear what its 
final form would be, a new majority of the Supreme Court57 in effect 
merged Bolden~ requirement of proving purpose with the Zimmer stan-
dards.58 In a six to three decision, with Justice White rather trium-
phantly writing the opinion of the Court, the Court ruled that the at-
large system in Burke County, Georgia, had been maintained for a ra-
cially discriminatory purpose, and that that purpose was indicated by 
almost the same list of factors that the Senate Report had set forth to 
prove the presence of a discriminatory effect. 59 The Court had returned 
to relatively clear pragmatism. 
III. There is No Bright Line in Gingles 
A. The Three Prongs: Separate or Together? 
It was four years after 1982 before the Supreme Court commented 
directly on the congressional amendments to section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act. In his opinion for the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles,60 Jus-
tice William Brennan proposed a seemingly simple and mechanical, but, 
in fact, potentially complex and sensitive, test for identifying minority 
vote dilution. The first "prong" of the Gingles test appears to rule out 
"influence districts" by stating that in cases involving multi-member elec-
toral districts, "the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single-member district."61 This and the other two prongs of the Gingles 
test-minority group political cohesion and ~bite bloc voting at a level 
sufficient to defeat minority-favored candidates in most instances62-
originated in the 1981-82 struggle to overturn City of Mobile v. Bolden .63 
In testimony before a House Judiciary subcommittee considering amend-
ments to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, James U. Blacksher, the 
attorney who argued before the United States Supreme Court on behalf 
of the plaintiffs in Bolden , attempted to answer the call in footnote 2664 
of Justice Potter Stewart's plurality opinion in Bolden for a judicially 
manageable standard for minority vote dilution in at-large election 
57. Justice Stewart had resigned, and his replacement, Justice O'Connor, sided with the 
new majority in Lodge, as did Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. 
58. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982). Actually, Justice White followed the prescient 
lead of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1978). 
59. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623-27. 
60. 478 u.s. 30 (1986). 
61. Id. at SO. 
62. !d. at S 1. 
63. 446 u.s. ss (1980). 
64. !d. at 78. 
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cases. 65 As Blacksher made explicit, the standard was developed to ap-
ply only to at-large elections,66 a fact also emphasized in Brennan's opin-
ion in Gingles.67 
Justice Brennan stated that he did not mean to decide "what stan-
dards should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group, that is not 
sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member 
district, alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its ability 
to influence elections. "68 Some courts, however, have sought to extend 
its application to single-member district racial gerrymandering cases. Is 
it logical to conclude that Brennan did decide the question-adversely to 
small minority groups-by implication? Does Gingles embody an ele-
mentary and general bright line test, invariably applicable to every sort of 
electoral system? 
Some courts and commentators appear to believe that it does. 69 
Happy to be supplied with a short checklist that seemingly obviates the 
need to inquire into the intentions of government officials or to weigh the 
various and more numerous factors involved in a "totality of the circum-
stances" inquiry, attorneys, expert witnesses, and judges alike have gen-
erally pried the three prongs of the Gingles test apart and considered 
them one by one. As has often been noted, the term "majority" by itself 
conceals problems: Does it mean a majority of the total population? Of 
the voting age population? Of voting age citizens? Of registered voters? 
Of those who actually torn out to vote? What is the legal or logical basis 
for choosing one of these definitions? 
Without minimizing these difficulties, the first Gingles prong is more 
logically understood when it is combined with the other two, that is, with 
variations in the cohesiveness ofboth majority and minority group voters 
over a series of different elections. Considered as one coherent standard, 
the Gingles test is not an abstract, mechanical criterion, but necessarily a 
65. Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., lst Sess. 2038-39 (1982) 
(testimony of James U. Blacksher). A later, more easily accessible presentation of the standard 
is in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 231, 234 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). 
66. MINORITY VOTE DIWTION, supra note 65, at 234. 
67. 478 U.S. at 46 n. l2. Justice Brennan explicitly reserved the question of whether the 
three-pronged test applied to discriminatory gerrymandering of single-member districts or 
other situations. 
68. /d. 
69. Romero v. City of Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir. 1989); Solomon v. Liberty 
County, 865 F.2d 1566, 1572 o.4 (lith Cir. 1988); Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista, 723 F. 
Supp. 1384, 1388 (S.D. Cal. 19&9). 
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flexible, practical one. 70 As minority group cohesiveness increases and 
majority group cohesiveness declines, the level of minority group concen-
tration necessary to elect the choice of that group declines, and vice 
versa. No single point of concentration which is much less than 100% 
guarantees minority or majority voters an ability to elect. No fixed, situ-
ation-free definition of a "majority., or "political majority., is possible. 
Any attempt to determine what a practical political majority is in any 
particular circumstance will involve courts in painstaking factual inquir-
ies. The following examples will demonstrate this point. 
B. There is No Fixed Definition of a "Political Majority" 
Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that an area is composed of only 
two ethnic groups, a "majority., group and a "minority., group, and that 
we have reliable statistics on the proportion of each group among those 
who actually vote in the district. Suppose also that the election pits a 
candidate favored by at least a majority of one group (the "majority's 
candidate.,) against a candidate favored by at least a majority of the 
other group (the "minority's candidate.,). Which candidate wins is a 
function not only of the proportion that minority voters form of the ac-
tive electorate, but also of the levels of cohesion among the two groups of 
voters.71 Table 1 illustrates this point in a theoretical electorate. 
70. See Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley,ldentifying and Remedying Racial Gerryman-
dering, 8 J.L. & PoL. 345, 354-56 (1992). 
71. Elections are about electing candidates, not about meeting some artificial, arbitrary 
target percentage. In the Ohio State Assembly reapportionment case, Quilter v. Yoinovich, 
794 F. Supp. 695, 698 (N.D. Ohio 1992), attorneys for the Republican majority on the State 
Apportionment Board claimed that the Voting Rights Act required them to increase the black 
proportion of voters in every district that was already represented by a black-packing which, 
of course, just happened to decrease black, and therefore, Democratic, influence in adjacent 
districts. The Board majority declared that this was especially important in the 7 of the II 
seats in which African-Americans did not comprise a majority u the population, but extensive 
white crossover voting allowed black representatives to win. The patent disingenuity of this 
explanation-Republicans were obviously concerned to elect their own (white) candidates by 
setting meaningless electoral targets for their opponents--poiJJts up the unreality of electoral 
numbers that have no necessary relation to electoral outcomes. 
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Table 1. The Relatimaship Between Majority and Minority 
Cohesiveness and the Minority Concentration 
Necessary tD Elect a Minority's Candidate 
% of Minority Level of Level of %For 
Group in Majority Minority Minority's 
District Cohesion Cohesion Candidate 
50% 100% 80% 40% 
70% 60% 45% 
100% 100% 50% 
70% 80% 55% 
40% 100% 100% 40% 
80% 80% 44% 
70% 80% 50% 
70% 85% 52% 
30% 100% 100% 30% 
80% 100% 44% 
70% 97% 50% 
60% 90% 55% 
20% 70% 100% 44% 
60% 100% 52% 
60% 80% 48% 
55% 70% 50% 
15% 70% 100% 41% 
60% 100% 49% 
55% 60% 47% 
55% 80% 50% 
10% 70% 100% 37% 
55% 60% 47% 
60% 100% 46% 
52% 80% 51% 
It is easy to see how each row of the table was calculated. Consider 
the first row. In an electorate equally divided between the two groups, 
suppose that all of the majority voters support the majority's candidate, 
while only 80% of the minority voters support the minority's candidate. 
Then the minority's candidate receives only 40% of the overall vote (0.5 
X 0. 8 = 0. 4 ). For the other three rows in the equally divided district, 
we make different assump(ions about cohesion and compute the results 
of the election in a similar manner. In the fourth row, for instance, the 
minority candidate receives 55% ((0.3 X 0.5 = 0.15) + (0.8 X 0.5 = 
0.4), and (0.15 + 0.40 = 0.55)). 
The table demonstrates two striking results: First, even where ma-
jorities of each group oppose each other's candidates, it is possible for the 
minority's candidate to win even when the minority comprises a tenth of 
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the electorate. As a matter of logic, the statement in the lower court 
opinion in Gingles that "no aggregation of less than 50% of an area's 
voting age population can possibly constitute an effective voting major-
ity" is simply false. 72 Second, there is no bright line, to use legal termi-
nology, or no "natural cutting-point," to adopt the jargon of social 
science, to differeutiate "control districts" from .. influence districts." 
Fifty percent of tbe voters is no magic number, nor is forty or thirty or 
twenty or even ten. 73 The outcome, even in this very simple example, 
depends on the relative cohesion of the two groups, and not just their 
proportions of the electorate. If the example were C001plicated in an at-
tempt to mimic the real world-including differential registration and 
turnout rates, different age structures, more than two ethnic groups, and 
variations in cohesion rates in different elections-the results would be 
even less determinant. If the point of the Gingles standard is to assure 
that members of minority groups have a fair opportunity to elect candi-
dates of their choice, and if it is outcomes, not just demographic goals 
that matter, then it is not a mechanical set of criteriL 
In order to draw any conclusions about a minority's opportunity to 
elect candidates of its choice, the cohesion of all ethnic groups needs to 
be empirically determined, not filled in purely by assumption. 74 
C. Evidence from the Real World 
The examples need not be merely hypothetical. Other scholars have 
demonstrated that the proportion of various minority groups necessary 
to elect a candidate from that minority group varied greatly from time to 
time and from place to place in the South during the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s. The fabled "65% Rule"7 s has no empirical nlidity. In certain 
states or counties in the South, a black population percentage of 65% 
was insufficient to dect a black candidate, especially during the first years 
72. Gingles v. Ed.Diisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 381 n.3 (E.D.N.C. 1984). 
73. Insisting that SO% of something amounted to an immutable-prerequisite in an at-large 
election case, Judge Gea.ld B. Tjotlat reversed a denial of relief to black plaintiffs who could 
make up 51 o/o of the wting age population in a single-member disuict. Solomon v. Liberty 
County, 865 F.2d 1566, 1574 (llth Cir. 1988). 
74. In Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Ark. 1991), for instance, Judge G. 
Thomas Eisele assumes dlat white cohesion against a black candidate is high and would rise as 
the proportion of blacks in a district rises. Otherwise, his conclusion that "the more black 
voters that are packed iato a single legislative district, short of a tm,iority, the less the voting 
power or influence in tlle state as a whole" does not bold. Jd at S70-7 I. But he makes no 
effort to test his assum~ons empirically. 
75. Ketchum v. B.)Tile, 740 F.2d 1398, 1415 (7th Cir. 1984), bJs a capsule description of 
the rule. 
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after the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965.76 In others, such as 
the university communities of Athens, Georgia, Gainesville, Florida, or 
Durham, North Carolina, it gradually became possible to elect African-
American candidates even though the proportion of African-Americans 
was less than 50%.n Summarizing evidence from Boston, Massachu-
setts, and Chicago, Dlinois, as well as Charleston, South Carolina, and 
Norfolk, Virginia, Kimball Brace and his colleagues conclude that "the 
65% Rule for the overall minority population codifies an exception 
rather than the norm . . . . Determining what is the appropriate popula-
tion percentage to assure a realistic opportunity to elect a candidate of 
choice in a given case is a matter of considerable complexity."78 
In California, the degree of white crossover voting and the percent-
age of the total Latino and Asian populations who register and vote vary 
at least as much from area to area as elsewhere in the country. Panel A 
of Table 2 focuses on the seven congressional districts (of the total of 
forty-five) in which Latinos or blacks held office in 1990.79 In none of the 
four occupied by blacks (districts 8, 28, 29, and 31) did the black percent-
age of the population exceed 34%. This, in effect, turns the 65% Rule on 
its head. In none of the three districts with Latino incumbents (districts 
25, 30, and 34) did the percentage of registered voters estimated to have 
been Latinos exceed 41%. In the liberal cities of Berkeley and Oakland, 
California, black Congressman Ron Dellums won a district in which An-
glos actually composed a majority of the population. All of the congress-
persons were Democrats, and in all of their districts, Democrats enjoyed 
substantial registration majorities, but those majorities were markedly 
less in the three Latino districts. Apparently, the Latino districts were 
drawn so that Latinos could control the Democratic primaries easily 
with the hope, which was realized, that non-Latino Democrats would 
76. In an attempt to rid the Montgomery City Council of Joe Reed, the leading black 
politician in the state of Alabama, Mayor Emory Folmar reduced Reed's district to a bit 
above the lowest black population percentage that some case law said was legal-68%. This 
action, the district court found, had a discriminatory intent. Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 
1473, 1483 (M.D. Ala. 1983). Since a 68% population majority may not have been enough to 
allow blacks to elect a candidate of their choice in Montgomery at the time (Folmar certainly 
hoped not), the move may also have been discriminatory purely on effect grounds. 
77. Bernard Grofman &: Lisa Handley, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black 
Representation in Southern State Legislatures, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. Ill , 111-28 (1991); Bernard 
Grofman & Lisa Handley, Preconditions for Black and Hispanic Congressional Success, in 
UNITED STATES ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THEIR IMPACT ON WOMEN AND MINORITIES 31-39 
(Wilma Rule & Joseph F. Zimmerman eds., 1992). 
78. Kimball Brace et al~ Minority Voting Equality: The 65 Percent Rule in Theory and 
Practice, 10 L. & PoL'Y 43, 52, 57 (1988). 
79. The data was supplied by Pac-Tech Data Research. I want to thank David Ely for 
his assistance in obtaining it. 
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rally behind the nominees in November. Black candidates seem to have 
been able to rely on more ethnic crossover votes within the Democratic 
pnmary. 
Table 2. Demographic and Political Traits of Minority 
Congressional and State Assembly Districts in 
California, 1990 
%Black %Latino 
District Number Pop.• Reg.•• 
% .Anglo 
Pop. 
% Democratic 
Reg. 
Panel A: Congressional Districts 
"Black Districts" 
8 25 5 52 
28 33 8 I6 
29 34 14 4 
31 29 12 19 
"Latino Districts" 
25 9 41 13 
30 I 40 17 
34 3 40 28 
Panel B: State Assembly Districts 
"Black Districts" 
l3 38 7 29 
17 I1 5 55 
47 23 18 5 
48 33 16 5 
49 40 5 27 
50 46 6 16 
54 22 9 38 
"Latino Districts" 
55 7 40 15 
56 3 66 6 
59 I 45 I9 
79 19 16 35 
• Pop. = population 
•• Reg. = estimated number of registered voters 
63 
72 
82 
7I 
57 
58 
61 
72 
63 
81 
83 
72 
77 
64 
66 
74 
61 
55 
The pattern in the eleven California State Assembly districts (of the 
total of eighty) represented by African-Americans and Latinos was more 
varied. 80 In one "black" district (district 17), Anglos made up five times 
as large a group as that of blacks. San Francisoo Speaker Willie Brown, 
however, never had to campaign seriously for his own seat during the 
1980s. None of the seven seats held by African-Americans was actually 
80. Three assembly districts were represented by men of P.onuguese ancestry. In con-
temporary California, they are not generally considered Latinos. 
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majority black in population, and only two were as much as 40% black. 
Of the four districts represented by Latinos, there was only one in which 
a majority of the estimated registered voters was Latino. In the seventy-
ninth district, where only a sixth of the registered voters were Latinos, 
Pete Chacon won an upset victory over his Republican opponent during 
the 1970s, when the opponent was fortuitously indicted a week before the 
general election. The three districts with the highest proportion of An-
glos (districts 17, 54, and 79) also had the lowest proportion of Demo-
crats, allowing black and brown candidates, in effect, to leverage their 
relatively low population proportions by winning Democratic nomina-
tions. Then they only had to hold Democratic defections down to be able 
to cement victories in the general elections. 
D. There is No Easy Escape from the Problem of Influence Districts 
Thus, a close analysis of the Gingles decision itself and a considera-
tion of hypothetical and actual election results demonstrate conclusively 
that any absolute, general distinction between minority control districts 
and minority influence districts is illogical, impractical, and legally un-
warranted. A court that dismissed a claim of vote dilution on the 
grounds that a minority concentration did not reach some mystical 
number-65%, 50%, 40%, or whatever-might well be robbing the 
group of a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of its choice. 81 Unless 
courts entertain such suits, they will be arbitrarily and unreasonably de-
nying the groups their rights under the United States Constitution and 
the Voting Rights Act. To cut off lawsuits with a bright line rule is to 
deny minority voters equal protection under the law. 
Similarly, any hard-and-fast definition of a minimum level of minor-
ity population necessary for that group to influence an election is nonsen-
sical. In an attempt to justify its refusal to adopt plans providing for a 
Delta congressional district where blacks would have a good chance of 
electing a candidate of choice, for instance, the Mississippi legislature of 
the early 1980s announced that any black percentage less than forty 
"would likely result in insensitivity [on the part of the congressperson] to 
81. One district coun judge rejected a district in which 5 I% of the registered voters were 
black on the proponional representation ground that since blacks constituted only 13% of the 
county's voting age population, they did nO( deserve to control one seat on a five·seat county 
commission. Potter v. Washington County, 653 F. Supp. 121, 129·31 (N.D. Fla. 1986). Ac· 
cording to Judge Roger Vinson's logic, whCD Congress rejected a proponional representation 
standard in 1982, it must have meant to esaablish proponional representation as a minimal 
threshold. and when Brennan SAJd a majority in Gingles, he actually meant a substantial major-
ity. Any contention that bright line standards reduce leeway for judges to impose their own 
values has a lot to account for in this opinion. 
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the black constituency."82 The legislature created two "stacked" dis-
tricts that were 45% and 48% black, instead of one 65% district. 83 This 
is a patent illustration of the use of an entirely arbitrary numerical figure 
to justify racial discrimination. Naming any minimum level for "influ-
ence" would only encourage other authorities to employ the same tactic 
used by the Mississippi legislature. 
IV. Influence District Decisions After Gingles 
A. The Range of Approaches 
Justice Brennan's decision in Gingles offered no clear guidance on 
the problem of influence districts. If the Supreme Court had meant to 
embrace a bright line definition, it could easily have endorsed those por-
tions of the lower court's decision in the case that explicitly endorsed a 
threshold of 50%84 and denied that there could be any "principled basis" 
for litigating influence districts. 8 s If the Court's silence has any implica-
tions at all, it suggests that Brennan was not disposed to erect such a 
mandatory gateway test. 
Since 1986, a variety of lower federal court decisions have touched 
on the problems of influence districts. Fortunately, three of them fully 
span the range of logic and the various approaches to the problem. The 
first, McNeil v. Springfield Park District,86 interprets each prong of Gin-
gles as a strict mandatory separate threshold; the second, Garza v. County 
of Los Angeles,81 sidesteps Gingles by relying on intent; while the third, 
Armour v. Ohio, 88 blends a brief analysis of intent with a discussion of the 
totality of the circumstances. A consideration of each case will suggest 
the advantages and deficiencies of each approach. 
B. The Fence Around Springfield Parks 
No black had ever served on the seven-member board of the Spring-
field, Illinois Park District, which was elected at-large. Despite the fact 
that it was possible to draw a seven-district plan containing one district 
that was slightly over 50% black in population, and despite the fact that 
82. Jordan v. Winter, 541 F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (N.D. Miss. 1982). 
83. /d. at 1139, 1143. 
84. Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345, 381 n.J (E.D.N.C. 1984). The three-judge 
court did not say what the denominator in the SO% threshold would be-population, voting 
age, turnout, etc. 
85. ld. at 381. 
86. 851 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1988). 
87. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). 
88. 775 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ohio 1991). 
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blacks had won election to the city's school board with white crossover 
votes, District Court Judge Richard Mills granted summary judgment to 
the Park Board because the voting age population in the proposed Park 
district would be only 43% African-American.89 No evidence of inten-
tional discrimination or of other White-Zimmer factors was considered. 
The appeals court affirmed, interpreting Gingles as requiring an un-
breachable 50% voting age population standard in at-large cases, 90 de-
spite the fact that Brmnan never clarified whether the majority was to be 
one of population, or potential voters, or actual voters, or minorities plus 
crossovers, etc. Noting that the majority threshold requirement had not 
been enunciated in White, Zimmer,9t or the 1982 Senate Report, Court 
of Appeals Judge Ridlard D. Cudahy praised it as a newly invented cri-
terion to block unnecessary litigation. "Courts might be flooded by the 
most marginal sectioo 2 claims if plaintiffs had to show only that an elec-
toral practice or proadure weakened their ability to influence elections," 
the judge asserted. 92 
Although Cudahy logically had to believe that a district in which 
African-Americans made up half of the population was some distance 
down a slippery slope; he also stated that the Gingles threshold required 
courts to "estimate approximately the ability of minorities in a single-
member district to elect candidates of their choice. " 93 Yet neither the 
district court nor the court of appeals made any effort to make such an 
estimate, and their rejection of a 43% black district implies a very high 
degree of racially p<Erized voting, a level often reached in the North 
only in elections characterized by stark racial appeals. Assuming that 
blacks and whites turned out equally and that all blacks voted for the 
same candidate, only 12% of the whites would have to crossover to elect 
the candidate who was_ the choice of a united black community.94 Rather 
89. McNeil v. Springjeld Park Dist., 658 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Ill. 1987). 
90. McNeil v. Sprin~ld Park Dist., 851 F.2d 937, 944-45 (7th Cir. 1988). 
91. Zimmer, as Judi!IC Cudahy noted, had declared that the size of the minority popula-
tion was not "the baromeller of vote dilution." Springfield Park Dist., 85 I F.2d at 943 n.8 
(quoting Zimmer, 485 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1973)). 
92. Springfield Park DisL, 851 F.2d at 947. 
93. !d. at 944. In Rybicki v. Board of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1113 (N.D. Ill. 
1982), Judge Cudahy had anployed a 65% rule for black state legislative districts in Chicago. 
In Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984), Cudahy had castigated a district court 
for using a 50% voting agepopu1ation threshold without closely examining "voter registration 
and tum-out patterns in theHispanic and black communities .... The district court must first 
gather and evaluate whatewr statistical and other types of evidence are available" in order to 
establish "historical and recent trends in the electoral patterns of the black and Hispanic com-
munities." !d. at 1412-14. lihe thread of consistency in these opinions is not easily discerned. 
94. In the II Ohio Slate Assembly districts that sent blacks to the legislature in the 
1980s, the percentage of wli.te crossover voting ranged from 35% to 68%. In 10 of the II, at 
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than attempt to determine the likely percentages empirically, through the 
"intensely local appraisal" called for in White, 95 the judges in this case 
were content to do what they accused the plaintiffs of doing: building 
"castles in the air, based on quite speculative foundations. "96 That is, 
they assumed, without evidence, that black cohesion or turnout or white 
crossovers or some combination of them would be insufficient to elect a 
black-chosen candidate. Moreover, their arguments strongly suggest 
that at least some of the White-Zimmer factors-which Congress in-
tended judges to apply in voting rights cases-would have been satisfied 
if a full trial had taken place. 
The judges in the Springfield Park District case sought to establish 
the principle that plaintiffs with frivolous cases did not deserve a full 
hearing. Rather than conducting a "totality of the circumstances" in-
quiry, as Congress had indicated in 1982 that it wished, the appeals court 
applied the first prong of the Gingles test separately and rigidly to save 
itself the trouble. Had the district court or the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered all three prongs of the test in combination, as Judge Cudahy in effect 
said courts should do, the judges would have found that minority candi-
dates could win an election in such a district with a minimal degree of 
white support, and that it was likely, on the basis of school board elec-
tions, that candidates who were the choices of the black community 
could at least sometimes obtain that level of crossover. In other words, 
had the Springfield Park District courts applied the Gingles prongs as a 
unitary test, which is just the standard to which Judge Cudahy's opinion 
paid lip service, then they would probably have sustained the plaintiffs' 
claim, even if they had insisted that influence district claims should not 
be entertained. Springfield blacks could probably have elected a candi-
date of their choice in a district where they comprised 43% of the poten-
tial voters. California and Ohio blacks have managed with much smaller 
proportions. 
C. Demographic Filibustering in Los Angeles 
The vast majority of the three-month federal district court trial in 
the anti-Latino gerrymandering case of Garza v. Los Angeles County97 
was devoted to presenting demographic and statistical evidence. Gingles, 
least 44% of the white voters supported the black candidate. Only one Ohio Assembly district 
that was over 35% black in population had failed to elect a black candidate since 1970. 
Quilter v. Voinovich, No. 91-CV-2219, slip op. at 6, 13-14 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 1992). 
95. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973). 
96. Springfield Park DisL, 851 F.2d 931, 944 (7th Cir. 1988). 
97. 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
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argued the County's private attorneys, implied that unless an equally 
populated district with a majority of Latino voters could have been 
drawn in 1981, no remedy could be afforded, and therefore, the question 
of liability was irrelevant. Considering it too risky to assume that judges 
would reject the defendants' argument, counsel for the plaintiffs mar-
shaled a parade of expert witnesses. The experts declaimed not only on 
ethnic polarization in elections, but also on such questions as how to 
estimate the proportion of Latino voting age citizens by precinct-figures 
no census taker had collected-how to project 1980 data forward to 
1989, and from which countries the parents of American-born people 
who designated themselves as "Hispanics" on census forms actually 
came. At times, the witnesses for the two sides resembled medieval theo-
logians debating the number of angels that could dance on the head of a 
pin. To many observers, it appeared bizarre that constitutional and legal 
rights could tum on whether an educated guess on which reasonable and 
honest statisticians could disagree was 48% or 52%, or perhaps even 
closer-especially since the practical political effect of either number was 
likely to be exactly the same. 
District Court Judge David V. Kenyon agreed with the plaintiffs 
that a district with a majority of voting age Latino citizens as of 1989 
could be drawn, and that 1989, not 1980, was the proper year at issue.98 
He then added two fall-back positions: Even if a 50% district could not 
be drawn, plaintiffs had shown that there would probably be enough eth-
nic crossover voting to elect a candidate who was the choice of the La-
tino community in a nearly-50% district. And even if that were 
disputable, the County Supervisors had intentionally gerrymandered dis-
tricts against Latinos in the past, committing a constitutional violation, 
as well as a violation of the Voting Rights Act. In other words, the 
County was liable under at least one of two definitions of discriminatory 
effect, or if not, then under discriminatory intent. 
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals finessed 
the 50% issue by resting its decision wholly on the grounds of intent.99 
The court held that, "to the extent that Gingles does require a majority 
showing, it does so only in a case where there has been no proof of inten-
tional dilution of minority voting strength." 100 Once intent was shown, 
the appeals court required only "some showing of injury" in order to 
98. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
99. Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). 
100. !d. at 769. Although he partially dissented on the remedy, Judge Alex Kosinski, a 
leading Reagan appointee to tbe bench. joined tbe liability portion of Judge Mary M. Schroe· 
der's opinion "without reservation." !d. at 778. 
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"assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy." 101 But 
the necessary injury was just the fragmentation of the core of the geo-
graphical area where Latinos concentrated, a fragmentation which the 
court concluded, without citing any evidence whatsoever, reduced Lati-
nos' opportunities to participate and elect candidates of their choice. 102 
Evidently, once the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the area had been 
intentionally split, violation of the "participate and elect" criterion fol-
lowed automatically, as a matter of common sense. Thus, Garza rejected 
both the bright line threshold standard and the attempt to render an in-
tent case superfluous by requiring a full showing of effect even after in-
tent had been proven. Whether the electoral district drawn during the 
remedy phase was an influence district or a control district was some-
thing ultimately for the voters and the candidates to decide. In the event, 
all four major candidates in the initial election using the new district 
were Mexican-Americans. 
D. Carving Up Youngstown 
Whenever the Democratic majority on the Ohio State Apportion-
ment Board, which designed districts for the Ohio State House of 
Representatives in 1971 and 1981, found a large enough minority con-
101. Id. at 771. In his dissent in Bolden, Justice Manhall argued that if intent were 
demonstrated in a Fifteenth Amendment case, no effect need be shown, and vice versa. City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 133-55 (1980). In Irby v. Fitz-Hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. 
Va. 1988), District Court Judge Richard L. Williams rejected the plaintiff's' contention that, 
once a discriminatory intent was shown for the passage of a law in the 1870s and its mainte-
nance in 1901 and 1956, no current intent or effect need be demonstrated. He asserted, how-
ever, that a finding of discriminatory intent would shift the burden of proof to the defendants 
to show that the system had no unequal effect that would support an inference of current 
discriminatory intent. Disregarding the Gingles facton altogether, he measured the degree of 
discrimination only against a proportional representation standard. Eighteen percent of Vir-
ginia's population was black, and eighteen percent of the state's appointed school board mem-
ben were black. The Fourth Circuit affinned on this ground. Irby v. Board of Elections, 889 
F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989). In most cases, defendants will have more trouble satisfying a pro-
portional representation criterion. 
102. Garza, 918 F.2d at 771. In an extreme opinion in Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F. Supp. 
553 (E.D. Ark. 1991), Judge G. Thomas Eisele ruled that only a retrogression in minority 
voting strength qualified as a discriminatory effect under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, id. 
at 566; that there was no retrogression in the case, id. at 584; that proving intent was insuffi-
cient unless effect were also proven, id. at 579; and therefore that intent was irrelevant, id. at 
583. He did not trouble himself to reconcile these legal positions with White, Bolden, Lodge, 
or the 1982 Senate Repon. Strongly contrary is the opinion of Judge Myron H. Thompson in 
the case of Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289, 297 (M.D. Ala. 1986), which ruled 
that if intent were proven for recently adopted electoral rules, no effect need be shown. Simi-
larly, in Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1484 (M.D. Ala. 1983), Thompson concluded 
that "even though a redistricting plan may accurately reflect the voting strength of a minority 
group, it is still invalid if it was adopted for a racially discriminatory purpose." 
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"assure that the district court can impose a meaningful remedy."10 1 But 
the necessary injury was just the fragmentation of the core of the geo-
graphical area where Latinos concentrated, a fragmentation which the 
court concluded, without citing any evidence whatsoever, reduced Lati-
nos' opportunities to participate and elect candidates of their choice. 1o2 
Evidently, once the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the area had been 
intentionally split, violation of the "participate and elect" criterion fol-
lowed automatically, as a matter of common sense. Thus, Garza rejected 
both the bright line threshold standard and the attempt to render an in-
tent case superfluous by requiring a full showing of effect even after in-
tent had been proven. Whether the electoral district drawn during the 
remedy phase was an influence district or a control district was some-
thing ultimately for the voters and the candidates to decide. In the event, 
all four major candidates in the initial election using the new district 
were Mexican-Americans. 
D. Carving Up Youngstown 
Whenever the Democratic majority on the Ohio State Apportion-
ment Board, which designed districts for the Ohio State House of 
Representatives in 1971 and 1981, found a large enough minority con-
101. /d. at 771. In his dissent in Bolden, Justice Marshall argued that if intent were 
demonstrated in a Fifteenth Amendment case, no effect need be shown, and vice versa. City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 133-55 (1980). In lrby v. Fitz-Hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. 
Va. 1988), District Court Judge Richard L. Williams rejected the plaintiffs' contention that, 
once a discriminatory intent was shown for the passage of a law in the 1870s and its mainte-
nance in 1901 and 1956, no current intent or effect need be demonstrated. He asserted, how-
ever, that a finding of discriminatory intent would shift the burden of proof to the defendants 
to show that the system had no unequal effect that would support an inference of current 
discriminatory intent. Disregarding the Gingles factors altogether, he measured the degree of 
discrimination only against a proportional representation standard. Eighteen percent of Vir-
ginia's population was black, and eighteen percent of the state's appointed school board mem-
bers were black. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on this ground. Irby v. Board of Elections, 889 
F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989). In most cases, defendants will have more trouble satisfying a pro-
portional representation criterion. 
102. Garza, 918 F.2d at 771. In an extreme opinion in Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F. Supp. 
553 (E.D. Ark. 1991), Judge G. Thomas Eisele ruled that only a retrogression in minority 
voting strength qualified as a discriminatory effect under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, id. 
at 566; that there was no retrogression in the case, id. at 584; that proving intent was insuffi-
cient unless effect were also proven, id. at 579; and therefore that intent was irrelevant, id. at 
583. He did not trouble himself to reconcile these legal positions with White, Bolden, Lodge, 
or the 1982 Senate Report. Strongly contrary is the opinion or Judge Myron H. Thompson in 
the case of Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 649 F. Supp. 289,297 (M.D. Ala. 1986), which ruled 
that if intent were proven for recently adopted electoral rules, no effect need be shown. Simi-
larly, in Buskey v. Oliver, 565 F. Supp. 1473, 1484 (M.D. Ala. 1983), Thompson concluded 
that "even though a redistricting plan may accurately reflect the voting strength of a minority 
group, it is still invalid if it was adopted for a racially discriminatory purpose." 
574 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW (Vol. 27 
centration to form a majority of a district, they drew one. When the 
concentration was too small, however, the consultants disregarded it, 
paying attention, instead, to the desires of white incumbents in the area. 
Accordingly, districts fifty-two and fifty-three cracked the black commu-
nity in Youngstown, joining two-thirds of it to one set of white suburbs, 
and the other one-third to other white suburbs. 1o3 Although the Board 
could have drawn two contiguous districts that were 36% black and 1% 
black, respectively, in fact it drew two with percentages of 25% and 
11 %. The actual districts split both incorporated and unincorporated 
areas more than the plaintiffs' proposed 36%/1% districts. 104 
Pointing out that Brennan's opinion in Gingles specifically refused to 
rule out influence districts, 105 and distinguishing contrary lower federal 
court cases which dealt with at-large elections rather than boundaries 
between single-member districts, 106 the majority of a three-judge panel 
ruled for the plaintiffs on both intent and effect grounds.107 Although 
Ezell Armour's attorneys did not put on a full-blown discriminatory in-
tent case, the court, in examining in detail all the elements of a "totality 
of the circumstances" case, did sketch much of the basis for an intent, as 
well as an effects case. For example, it found a history of extralegal seg-
regation in schools and other instances of discrimination, including a 
takeover of the city government by the Ku Klux Klan during the 1920s, 
racial appeals in recent campaigns, racial violence, and racially polarized 
voting 108-all of which would be part of an intent case, because they no 
doubt conditioned the expectations and actions of voters and of key deci-
sion-makers in the reapportionment. As did the court in Garza, the Ar-
mour court emphasized that white incumbents helped to engineer a split 
in the minority community in order to benefit themselves. 109 
Judge Alice M. Batchelder dissented, ignoring the intent portion of 
the Armour majority's decision, citing Springfield Park District, but ad-
ding nothing to the criticisms of the justiciability of influence districts in 
the opinion, and offering only a scattershot, self-contradictory critique of 
the plaintiff's racial polarization analysis. On the one hand, Batchelder 
103. Armour v. Ohio, nsF. Supp. 1044, 1060-61 (N.D. Ohio 1991). It is unclear from 
the published opinion what criteria the Apponionment Board used to determine whether 
blacks had a "majority" in an area, or how closely connected black communities had to be to 
be eligible for consolidation mto a district. 
104. !d. at 1047-48, 1064-67. 
105. !d. at 1051-52. 
106. !d. at 1052 n.2; aCCDrd Emison v. Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427, 436 (D. Minn. 1992). 
107. 775 F . Supp. at 1060-ol. 
108. !d. at 1061. 
109. !d. 
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proposed to discard as irrelevant to this case analyses of elections other 
than those for the House; on the other hand, she criticized the plaintiffs' 
expert for having too few remaining cases on which to rest a solid conclu-
sion. 110 By endorsing the view in Springfield Park District that blacks 
could not elect a candidate in a district in which they did not constitute a 
majority, Batchelder implicitly assumed that voting was markedly po-
larized along racial lines. Yet she also asserted that, with 25% of the 
voters, blacks could control the Democratic primary and win the general 
election in District fifty-three, a position that assumed a considerable 
willingness of whites to vote for a candidate endorsed by black voters. 111 
Although she concluded her opinion by touting a discriminatory intent 
standard in Fifteenth Amendment cases, she did not say how a racially 
discriminatory intent might be proved to her satisfaction or why the ma-
jority's evidence of intent was insufficient. 112 
E. The Tale of Three Cases 
These three decisions further focus our approach to influence dis-
tricts. Rigid, absolute thresholds either repulse potentially winning mi-
nority candidates, as in Springfield Park District, or consume inordinate 
amounts of the courts' time and the parties' efforts and expense, as in 
Garza. Sensitively applied, the three-pronged Gingles test may be more 
complicated and less certain than a totality of the circumstances inquiry, 
whether such an inquiry is characterized as a discriminatory effect test or 
a discriminatory intent test. 113 After Garza and Armour, attorneys for 
plaintiffs may wish at least to add intent components to their cases, and 
attorneys for both plaintiffs and defendants will have to study history, as 
well as statistics and demography. 
V. Purpose and Effect Standards for Influence Districts 
A. A Double Standard 
How, then, should courts approach cases in which the proportion of 
one or more minority groups in a potential district is not overwhelming? 
In keeping with the Congress' desire in amending section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act in 1982, courts should consider both discriminatory effect 
and purpose standards. The effect standard recognizes that estimates are 
110. ld. at 1073-75 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
Ill. ld. at 1088. 
112. Jd. 
113. Here, I differ with Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Identifying and Remedying 
Racial Gerrymandering, 8 J.L. & PoL 345, 357-59 (1992). 
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uncertain and that in this instance, they are subject to eventualities 
outside a court's control-the willingness of attractive candidates to run, 
the ability to pull together inter-ethnic coalitions, the degree of involve-
ment of various groups in the political system. The discussion of intent 
reflects an attempt to make that inquiry as systematic as possible. 
B. Proving Effect in Influence District Cases 
Decrying the "artificiality" of the distinction between "influence" 
and "control" districts, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asserted in her 
concurrence in Gingles that: 
if a minority group that is not large enough to constitute a voting ma-
jority in a single-member district can show that white support would 
probably be forthcoming in some such district to an extent that would 
enable the election of the candidates its members prefer, that minority 
group would appear to have demonstrated that, at least under this 
measure of its voting strength, it would be able to elect some candi-
dates of its choice. 1 14 
The Gingles standard, as interpreted in this Article-that is, as a single 
test, not as three separate ones-would require just that, with one 
amendment: In areas where there is more than one minority group, 
the potential for crossovers between minority groups should also be 
considered. 
In practical terms, the first question to ask in district boundary cases 
is whether an area of minority group concentration has been split. 11s 
Whether one or more places qualify as such an area must be determined 
by the specifics of each case. Some general guidelines for qualification 
should be that the locations are: (1) geographically close together; (2) 
socioeconomically related; and/or (3) that the jurisdiction has tradition-
ally joined them together into the same district or placed comparably 
close areas into one district. For instance, in Monterey County, Califor-
114. 478 U.S. 30, 89 n.1 (1986). In Chisom v. Roemer, Ill S. Ct. 2354, 2365, 2371-72 
(1991), Justices John Paul Stevens and Antonin Scalia disagreed sharply over whether the 
"participate and elect" standard is unitary-i.e., whether the fact of unequal opponunity to 
panicipate in elections is sufficient by itself to violate the Voting Rights Act. As Scalia points 
out, Stevens' majority view that Congress meant the phrase to be a unit may imply that minor-
ities that cannot show with certainty that they can elect candidates in proposed districts will be 
denied any remedy. But once it is realized that there is no dear dividing line between influence 
and control, the controversy dissolves. There is merely a continuum of more or less participa-
tion. Had Stevens and Scalia paid more attention to O'Connor's footnote in Gingles, there 
would have been no reason for their charges and countercharges. Judge Arnold put the point 
simply and logically in Je.ffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 (E. D . Ark. 1989): "If I can vote at 
will but never elect anyone, my political ability is less than yours." /d. at 204. 
II 5. Here, I agree with Bernard Grofman & Lisa Handley, Identifying and Remedying 
Racial Gerrymandering, 8 J.L & POL. 345, 372 (1992). 
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nia, the nearby c1t1es of Seaside and Marina and the adjacent and 
socioeconomically related military base of Fort Ord were divided among 
four supervisorial districts by the reapportionment of 1991. Rejecting a 
proposed district in which African-Americans constituted 20% of the 
population and Asian/Pacific Islanders 16%, the supervisors instead 
adopted a plan in which neither made up more than 10% of any dis-
trict.1 16 Seaside, Marina, and Fort Ord were joined in a school district, 
and although they had been placed in different supervisorial districts, 
other areas that were much farther apart had long been included in the 
same supervisorial districts within the county. Such a fragmentation 
would establish either the beginnings of a discriminatory effect case or, 
under Garza, the necessary injury in a discriminatory intent case. 
Fragmentation would also demonstrate foresight in a discriminatory 
intent case because in recent reapportionments planners have calculated 
and highlighted the ethnic percentages in different districts under alter-
native proposed boundaries. Therefore, the decision-makers must have 
been aware of the ethnic consequences of their actions. 117 The current 
technology and self-consciousness of reapportionments guarantees that 
any fragmentation was foreseen. The country's long history of discrimi-
nation against minorities in politics suggests that the redistricters who 
severed minority areas meant to treat minorities with less concern and 
respect than they did whites. 
The second step in a discriminatory effect case would be to deter-
mine, through an analysis of past voting records in the area, whether a 
minority concentration at the level of the proposed district would signifi-
cantly improve the opportunity of the dominant minority group, in coali-
tion with some members of other groups, to elect candidates of its choice. 
If under the previous or status quo arrangement-either an at-large sys-
tem or single-member districts with different boundaries-the minority 
group had regularly been able to elect candidates of its choice, including 
members of the minority group itself,118 then it would be extremely diffi-
I 16. J. Morgan Kousser, Tacking, Stacking, and Cracking: Race and Reapportionment in 
Monterey County, 1981-1992 (Sept. 9, 1992) (unpublished report written in connection with 
Gonzalez v. Monterey County, 808 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). 
117. See. e.g., Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 589 (E.D. Ark. 1990), for a judicial 
example of this reasoning. 
118. American political history overwhelmingly demonstrates that, other things being 
equal, members of particular ethnic groups mostly prefer to elect "one of their own." It was 
true of the Irish in the 19th century, and it is true of African-Americans and Latinos today. 
Cf Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 198 (E.D. Ark. 1989). When the electoral structure is 
sufficiently discriminatory and the level of racial bloc voting by the dominant group is suffi-
ciently high, however, blacks, Latinos, and Asian/Pacific Islanders may have no choice but to 
vote for Anglo candidates. It would be a sad irony if such white-on-white elections were cited 
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cult to make out a discriminatory effect case. If, on the other hand, there 
was evidence of potent, but generally unsuccessful coalitions between 
members of different minority groups or between one or more of the 
groups and the majority group, then a case might succeed. In consider-
ing likely future electoral success, one should, of course, be aware that 
changes in the demographic mix may well alter perceived electoral op-
portunities: If minority candidates feel that they have little chance to 
win, few or no serious minority candidates may run; whereas, when they 
suddenly have a greatly enhanced ability to be elected, the number of 
serious minority candidates and the extent of minority participation may 
rise dramatically. 119 Therefore, a failure of small minority groupings to 
produce minority candidates is not, as Judge Eisele implies in his partial 
concurrence in Jeffers v. Clinton, proof that voting will not be racially 
polarized in districts with larger proportions of minority citizens. 120 In 
partisan contests, the proportion of the dominant minority group neces-
sary to have a high probability of effectively controlling the district might 
well be lower than in nonpartisan elections, because a percentage well 
below 50% of the voters could comprise a majority of the dominant 
political party. In such an instance, the crucial question would be the 
likely extent of white or other group defection from minority-endorsed 
party nominees in the general election. 
As argued in Part III of this Article, there is no absolute, situation-
free threshold for the ability to elect candidates of choice. An acceptance 
of this relativism solves one of the most common problems raised about 
influence districts. Suppose a planner has the option of creating two 
20% minority districts, or one 30% and one 10% district. What should 
the planner do, and what is she legally required to do? This Article im-
plies that, other things being equal, the planner should adopt the 30%/ 
10% solution, rather than the 20%/20% solution, because, first, it mini-
as conclusive evidence tbll minorities bad attained tbeir political goals by voting for tbe win· 
ning white. Such a counting rule would, in effect, reward the most discriminatory places for 
the1r stalwartness in bloc YOUng and erecting effective legal barriers. For examples of such a 
rule, su Judge Chapman's dissent in Collins v. Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232, 1247 (4th Cir. 1989); 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Evans, 785 F. Supp. 1469, 1473-76 (M.D. AJa. 
1992). 
119. Although there had not been a serious Latino candidate for supervisor in Los Angeles 
County from 1958 to 1990, after a new electoral district was drawn in the remedy phase of 
Garza. aU of the major candidates were Mexican-Americans. In Monterey County, after two 
black candidates for supemsor finished first in primary elections, but lost in runoffs in 1976, 
and the districts were redrawn to " whiten" each in 1981, no blacks ran for supervisor. 
although two black politicians indicated in court documents connected with Gonzalez v. Mon-
terey County, 808 F. Supp. n7 (N.D . Cal. 1992), that they would have run during the 1980s 
had the district lines been drawn more favorably. 
120. Jeffers v. Clinton. 730 F. Supp. 196, 274-77 (E.D . Ark. 1989) (Eisele, J ., concurring). 
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mizes fragmentation, and second, it improves the opportunity of mem-
bers of the minority group, in coalition with some members of other 
groups, to elect candidates of their choice, and perhaps even makes that 
election rather likely. 
The relativistic position also helps to solve the mirror image of the 
influence problem, the "packing" dilemma. What criteria should a plan-
ner or court adopt to decide whether a minority group's overall political 
power has been decreased by concentrating them in "too few" districts? 
Whereas an absolute standard would compare the concentration to some 
arbitrary level-65%, 50%, or whatever-and condemn a plan that 
"wasted" minority votes by creating districts in excess of that level, a 
relativistic approach would consider the proportion necessary to elect a 
candidate of choice with a high probability in a particular situation at a 
particular time. In some places, the level might be in the range of 70-
80%; in others, 20-30%. And the "excess" minority populations left 
over after the drawing of highly concentrated districts would not be con-
sidered as legally or politically worthless, but as providing the basis for 
possibly inftuential groupings. As part of a remedy for illegally packed 
districts, courts should create districts in which minority groups can ex-
ert as much influence as possible. 
Aside from the Gingles test, should there be any role for the other 
White-Zimmer factors in a discriminatory effect case? This Article sug-
gests that attorneys and judges would be well advised to include a discus-
sion of them for two reasons. First, they bear on the probability that 
members of a minority group will be able to elect candidates of their 
choice.121 The history of discrimination and its continuing consequences 
in an area affects the expected cohesiveness and participation levels of 
members of a minority group. A slating process or racial appeals in cam-
paigns may affect the level of crossovers between majority and minority 
groups. Discriminatory electoral devices may facilitate or retard the ra-
cial polarization of politics among different groups and therefore affect 
expectations of the degree of crossovers in a changed system. For in-
stance, a minority community that is submerged in an at-large election 
system or in districts that fragment it may not foster minority candidates, 
but could be expected to do so under a fairly drawn single-member dis-
trict system. The effects of this shift on voter and candidate behavior 
should be taken into account in assessing the possibility that minority 
communities would be able to elect candidates of their choice under a 
121. Compare Judge Tjollat's prudential advice in Solomon v. I:.iberty County, 865 F.2d 
1566, 1573 n.8, 1581 (lith Cir. 1988). 
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proposed system.122 Second, the three-pronged test in Brennan•s opinion 
in Gingles commanded only five votes. Justice o•connor•s concurrence, 
which opted for a totality of the circumstances approach, attracted three 
more votes. With the changes in the Supreme Court's makeup-two 
members from each side no longer serve-it is unclear how secure the 
Gingles test is as a precedent. 
Either a White-Zimmer analysis or a sophisticated version of the 
Gingles test will require considerable attention to local detail, and the 
outcome of a discriminatory effects case will not be obtained by mechani-
cally filling in a few demographic statistics. This is as it should be, for 
the problems of racial relations in American politics are complex and 
extremely varied in our most variable, ever-changing country. To try to 
impose a single uniform solution is to ignore both our history and our 
contemporary diversity. 
C. The Search for Intent Can Be Systematic 
Inquiries into discriminatory intent have a worse reputation than 
they deserve. After laying the basis for a discriminatory intent case in his 
opinion in Ketchum v. Byrne, 123 Judge Cudahy condemned the process of 
proving intent as "inherently speculative" and commended the 1982 
Congress for removing "the elusive and perhaps meaningless issue of 
governmental 'purpose' " as a prerequisite in voting rights cases. 124 Ber-
nard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard Niemi declare that the stan-
dard for proving intent in voting rights cases may be a "moot issue" after 
the 1982 amendments, because Congress concluded that "intent was so 
difficult to prove" and because "proving racism" was "burdensome and 
racially divisive." 12s In a report for Gonzalez v. Monterey County, Han-
dley essentially argued that discriminatory intent is utterly irrelevant in 
voting rights cases, because even if one demonstrates a racially discrimi-
natory intent, one must still make the same showing of discriminatory 
effect as if one had ignored discriminatory intent altogether. This is con-
trary not only to the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Garza, but also to logic and 
Handley's earlier writings. 126 It is instructive to note that the most 
122. The Fifth Circuit's failure to consider this possibility vitiates its argument in Brewer 
v. Ham, 876 F.ld 448 (5th Cir. 1989). 
123. 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984). 
124. /d. at 1408-10. 
125. BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR 
VOTING EQUALITY 42, 52 (1992) [hereinafter MINORITY REPRESENTATION]. 
126. Lisa R . Handley, Proving Injury in an Intentional Discrimination Suit: A Report for 
Gonzalez v. Monterey County Board of Supervisors 2 (Oct. 7, 1992) (unpublished report writ-
ten in connection with Gonzalez v. Monterey County, 808 F. Supp. 727 (N.D . Cal. 1992)) 
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scathing criticisms of discriminatory intent contentions have recently 
come from the right, not the left, of the political spectrum. In his dissent 
in the Louisiana "creation science" case, for instance, Justice Antonin 
Scalia asserted that "discerning the subjective motivation of those enact-
ing the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task." 127 
Such criticisms ignore the fact that an inquiry into discriminatory 
effect may be highly uncertain, as argued above, and that an examination 
of discriminatory intent may be systematic, as demonstrated in the Garza 
case, and as shown at length in a paper based on the author's testimony 
in Garza. 128 The following briefly summarizes the nine intent factors de-
scribed in more detail in the author's above-referenced paper, as well as 
the rationales for each factor. Together, they show how one can ap-
proach such questions more objectively. 
The first factor is models of human behavior in particular situations, 
which are often drawn from experience or research. For instance, have 
lines between electoral districts been used elsewhere to make it more diffi-
cult for members of protected minority groups to elect candidates of their 
choice? The answer is, of course, yes, and the more historians and expert 
witnesses learn about such instances, the more they find racially and po-
litically discriminatory purposes and effects in reapportionment. During 
the "First Reconstruction" after the Civil War-just as soon as African-
Americans constituted a large enough enfranchised group to have a ma-
jor influence on elections in the United States-whites began to draw 
district lines to dilute black political power. The Garza case showed con-
clusively that racial gerrymandering takes place in contemporary Cali-
fornia. It is also the tritest of truisms to note that politicians' self-interest 
is never closer to the surface than during reapportionment. When those 
who do the redistricting are all Anglo, and members of minority groups 
form large groups of voters, one should at the very least be on guard for 
the possibility of discriminatory acts. 
Such models, whether explicit or implicit, whether based on scholar-
ship or experience, whether acknowledged or unacknowledged, do affect 
where the analyst starts, and the only honest thing to do is to be con-
scious of the fact and to admit it. Someone who believes that politicians 
[hereinafter Handley, Proving Injury]. Cf Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763,771 
(9th Cir. 1990); Lisa Handley, The Quest for Minority Voting Rights 2SO n.28 (1991) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University); MINORITY REPRESENTATION, 
supra note l2S, at 114, 143 n.30. 
127. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. S18, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J ., dissenting). Similarly, see 
Chisom v. Roemer, Ill S. Ct. 23S4, 2376 ( 1991) (Scalia, J. , dissenting). 
128. J. Morgan Kousser, How to Determine Intent: Lessons/rom LA., 7 J.L. & PoL S91 
(1991). 
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are always selfless altruists who draw district lines thinking only of the 
public good, and never of the effects on their own political fortunes and 
those of their partisan or ideological allies, will expect to find only disin-
terested motives in particular cases. The most hard-boiled political con-
sultants claimed during the Garza case to have acted entirely selflessly. 
More skeptical observers do not take such statements at face value. 
The second factor is the historical context. Were racial issues or 
political campaigns by members of minority groups important at the time 
and place? In Garza, for instance, it was extremely significant that there 
was special redistricting in 1959 that resulted in a large shift of Anglo 
voters in West Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, and West Hollywood, from 
the Fourth to the Third District. This came less than a year before the 
census was taken and just after a very close contest in the Third District 
in which an Anglo candidate defeated a Mexican-American candidate. 
A third factor may be the exact text of a law or the exact lines of a 
redistricting, and a fourth is basic demographic facts. To what extent did 
the district lines fragment minority communities? Here, the discrimina-
tory intent and effect cases overlap considerably. How many members of 
relevant minority groups were there, how concentrated were they, and 
what were the trends in the population? In Garza, the rapid growth of 
the Latino population in an area split between two supervisorial districts 
was an important fact that did not escape the attention of those who 
drew district lines. During the redistricting in Monterey County in 1991-
92, the wide array of plans, all with demographic totals neatly attached, 
as if to prove that ethnic considerations could never have been missed by 
any participant, shows just how ethnically self-conscious the line-draw-
ing by the all-white board was. 129 Every proposed district line tells a 
story. 
Two basic political facts that constitute the fifth factor are the 
number of minority group members elected and the approximate extent 
of racial polarization among the voters. The former is a measure of dis-
criminatory effect, and the latter, insofar as it is widely known, can be 
assumed to inform the decisions of those who design electoral structures. 
For example, in Los Angeles County before 1991, it was well known that 
no Latino had served as a supervisor in this century, and it was widely 
understood that Latino candidates had little chance to win elections in 
overwhelmingly Anglo districts. Therefore, redistricters had to have 
been well aware that districts that contained large majorities of Anglo 
129. 1. Morgan Kousser, Tacking, Stacking, and Cracking: Race and Reapponionment in 
Monterey County, 1981-1992 (Sept. 9, 1992) (unpublished repon written in connection with 
Gonzalez v. Monterey County, 808 F. Supp. 727 (N.D. Cal. 1992)) . 
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voters were extremely unlikely to elect candidates that were the first pref-
erences of Latinos. In Monterey County, no black or Latino has been 
elected supervisor in this century, although two black candidates 
threatened to win during the 1970s, before the 1981 reapportionment. 
The sixth and seventh factors are the background of key decision-
makers and other actions that they performed. Were they all white? Did 
they allow all minority groups a real forum in which they could express 
themselves on the decision? What other policies that affected minority 
groups did the decision-makers favor and carry out? 
Sometimes, decision-makers will make what are termed "smoking 
gun" statements, and they constitute the eighth factor. When a "num-
bered post" system was substituted for a "free-for-all" at-large election 
system in Memphis, Tennessee in 1959, a newspaper article on the rele-
vant bill, based on interviews with legislators, was headlined "Bill ... Has 
Racial Purpose."130 The story went on to explain at length just how 
blacks would be disadvantaged by the change. In California in the late 
twentieth century, politicians are generally too careful to make "smoking 
gun" statements. 
State policies and formal and informal institutional rules constitute 
the final factor. If a locality is merely following a mandated state policy 
(for instance, one providing for at-large elections for all cities of a speci-
fied size range), then it is difficult to attribute any particular motive to 
the locality. Departures from usual rules or practices may hint at ulte-
rior motives. 131 In a recent case decided by the United States Supreme 
Court, boards of county supervisors in Alabama, after the first election of 
a black board member, changed the rules to strip individual board mem-
bers of powers that they had previously possessed. 132 Although the 
Court decided that such a move did not have to be cleared by the Justice 
Department, it seems likely that it could be challenged as intentionally 
discriminatory under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Four-
teenth Amendment. In reapportionment cases, inconsistency in dealing 
with different areas or groups, or inconsistent or frivolous justifications of 
various decisions, may provide evidence of ulterior, possibly racial 
motives. 
130. MEMPHIS PRESS·SCtMITAR, Feb. 19, 1959, at 4. 
131. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 638 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (5th Cir. 1981), on the 
switch from single-member districts to at-large el~tions in the wake of the outlawing of the 
white primary. 
132. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992). 
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D. Testing Other Explanations 
Arraying the evidence under these nine rubrics is not the end of the 
inquiry. Deciding that racial motives played a significant role in shaping 
an electoral rule or boundary requires one to set out and assess other, 
competing rationales or explanations for the device. What is the best 
warranted explanation? 
Those who wrote the electoral rules and lawyers defending them 
will probably suggest rationales or explanations besides racially discrimi-
natory ones. Even if they do not, it is nearly always possible to formulate 
superficially plausible hypotheses of good intentions (e.g., they were try-
ing to help minorities) and other intentions (they wanted to preserve city 
boundaries, draw "compact" districts, or insure majoritarianism as an 
abstract principle). Every such theory should be stated as clearly as pos-
sible and all evidence for and against all of them should be arrayed as 
fairly and objectively as the analyst can manage within the time and 
space available. (If an expert leaves anything out, surely opposing law-
yers will fill it in.) In the end, the expert and ultimately the judge must 
weigh the evidence and decide whether the thesis that the rule makers 
intended to discriminate is well-founded. Discrimination need not have 
been their sole or primary motive, but it must have been an important 
one or one necessarily entailed by an important one. It may have been 
possible to protect white incumbents, for instance, only by disadvantag-
ing potential minority challengers.133 
Whatever the outcome, the determination of discriminatory intent 
will always be a matter of judgment (isn't that what judges are supposed 
to do?), rather than a mechanical task, and the process of sifting the 
evidence will be exactly the same whether the minority group constitutes 
75% of a population or 10%. In determining discriminatory intent, 
there is no difference whatsoever between influence districts and control 
districts. 
E. A Defense of the Influence Concept 
Bright line standards circumscribe, but preserve rights. Some in the 
voting rights community134 fear that recognizing the unrealistic nature of 
133. Rybicki v. Board of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1109-10 (N.D. lit. 1982); Garza v. 
County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 768 n.l (9th Cir. 1990). 
134. This part prirnanly responds to comments made at the University of San Francisco 
Voting Rights Symposium. Nov. 6-7, 1992, and transmitted to me by Nancy Ramirez. I want 
to thank Nancy for her assistance in this respect, but reserve for myself any criticism for errors 
in the transmogrification of the arguments. I have stated the arguments in my own words and 
have attempted to develop them logically. 
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such a standard in this instance will endanger rights already seemingly 
won-that Anglo judges may decide that it is "best" for minority voters 
to have their influence spread widely, rather than being able to control 
some districts, or that they may rule that the decision on what is best for 
minorities should not be made by judges, but should properly be left up 
to elected Anglo politicians. Better to force a 49% minority or a 10% 
minority to fend for itself, the argument goes, than to hazard the Joss of 
minority representation by stressing that influence is a relative, not an 
absolute concept, and suggesting that judges must scrutinize the political 
process carefully and realistically in order to protect minority rights in 
accordance with the Constitution and the laws. Judges want a simple 
test--don't puncture their illusions! 
Thus, Grofman, Handley, and Niemi proclaim that "the Gingles 
three-pronged test places the focus on a set of relatively clear, objective 
criteria, creating a manageable standard with a list of critical factors that 
is both small and closed ended.''135 They fear that if influence district 
claims are allowed, "minorities might be harmed more than helped .... 
The concept of influence is murky .... Where there are 'electability' 
claims at issue, there is a natural threshold. Without such a threshold, 
how does one decide whether shifting minorities from one district to an-
other increases or decreases their overall influence?" 136 
In a report for Gonzalez v. Monterey County, Handley rejects a 50% 
population standard, but proposes the use of a sophisticated bright line 
test. To merit relief, Handley suggests plaintiffs must be able to show 
that they could garner enough minority and white crossover support to 
win a future election in a reconfigured district. 137 For instance, suppose 
a district could be drawn in which minority voters comprised 20% of the 
population. Consider the range of percentages of majority and minority 
cohesion in a 20% district in Table 1, above. If in past elections in a 
district in the area with less than 20% minority voters, 60% of the ma-
jority voters had voted for the majority-preferred candidate, and 100% 
of the minority voters had voted for the minority-preferred candidate, 
then if the same cohesion levels continued in the 20% minority district, 
the minority-preferred candidate would obtain 52% of the vote. In that 
case, Handley would say that the minority plaintiffs were at least poten-
tially eligible for relief, depending on other facts in the case. If minority 
cohesion in the previous election had been only 80%, however, the mi-
nority-preferred candidate, under the same assumptions, would be ex-
135. MINORITY REPRESENTATION, supra note 125, at 117. 
136. MINORITY REPRESENTATION, supra note 125, at 117-1& 
137. See Handley, Proving Injury, supra note 126. 
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pected to win only 48% of the vote, and Handley would say that 
plaintiffs had not met the threshold test and deny them any relief. 138 
But as Grofman, Handley, and Niemi are well aware, 139 there are no 
natural thresholds, and the ability of social science to predict future out-
comes is imperfect. Influence is a continuum, not an absolute. Unless 
there is a revolution in theories of human behavior, it will never be possi-
ble to establish a precise point, even in a particular jurisdiction at a par-
ticular time, above which one group is guaranteed an election, and below 
which, it will certainly lose. Even though Handley's proposed test for 
influence districts is much more subtle and flexible than a pure demo-
graphic criterion, it is still more sharp-edged than the predictive capacity 
that social science allows. There are just too many variable factors--the 
availability of skilled candidates, national or state electoral trends, the 
temperature of racial issues at the time, etc.-to be able to forecast future 
political outcomes within a very few percentage points. The best we can 
do is to say that, up to the range at which districts are "too packed" with 
members of one group, every increase in the group's proportion is an 
increase in its influence, other things being equal. 
Se,cond, good theories are not based on fictions. If a proposed bright 
line is not as clear as its proponents contend, the legal community will 
discover that fact eventually, placing the whole enterprise at risk. Better 
to acknowledge a frailty now and deal with it than to hazard a collapse 
later. 
Third, as stressed above, small clusters of minorities need and de-
serve protection at least as much as large clusters. As voters from differ-
ent ethnic groups become more willing to cast crossover votes, the 
opportunities for members of minority groups to be elected will be en-
hanced, not damaged by drawing influence districts. If African-Ameri-
can, Latino, and Asian aspirants can run not only in majority-minority 
districts, but also in districts that are, for example, 20-49% minority, 
then over the long run, there will be more, not fewer members of these 
groups in office. 
138. During the course of the Gonzalez case, plaintiffs drew a district that was 23% black 
in total population. Using statistics from the campaign of the last black candidate in the major 
part of the district, which took place in 1976, Handley contended that it would take a district 
that was 26% black to guarantee a black candidate in the 1990s a majority, and argued that 
therefore plaintiffs should be denied relief. In fact, if one included only those areas with high 
white crossover voting in 1976. which formed nearly all of the plaintiffs' proposed new district, 
the prediction would be that a black candidate (under the same circumstances as in the 1976 
elecuora) would receive 49% of the vote in a 23% black district. It would seem e.xtremely 
arbitrary to deny relief on the basis of numbers that were at once this close and this uncertain. 
139. MINORITY R EPRESENTATION, supra note 125, at 120. 
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Fourth, influence districts enrourage interracial roalitions, and a 
standard that concentrates minority groups dimmishes the probability 
that they will forever be rondemned to be distinctly junior coalition part-
ners. If members of minority groups are scattered randomly across dis-
tricts, then residual racism among Anglo voters and the present effects of 
past and present ethnic discrimination will rontinue to hamper minority 
political power. If, instead, we recognize that members of minority 
groups rontinue to need special safeguards to overrome persisting dis-
crimination and racism, and we roncentrate minority voters to provide 
those safeguards, then politicians of all races will be less able to ignore 
minority voters or take them for granted even in districts where the mi-
norities will probably not be able to win outright. 
Those who favor a bright line standard to create heavily minority 
districts err for the same reason as those who oppose any judicial or ad-
ministrative intervention in matters of electoral structure at all Both 
treat racism or racial discrimination as categorical, rather than as 
interval-level variables. 140 But the history of inter-ethnic attitudes and 
behavior in the United States and elsewhere shows that racism or ethno-
centrism is not like a simple light switch, either off or on, but like a more 
sophisticated dimmer switch. 141 Proponents of rontrol districts think 
that in the vast majority of places, the racist light is still completely on; 
their opponents, that it is usually rompletely off. Racism has faded 
markedly, but by no means totally, in the United States since the 1940s. 
Promoting judicial and administrative procedures that require practical, 
particularized appraisals and remedies that include districts in which mi-
norities will enjoy various degrees of infiuence recognizes that racism is a 
variable phenomenon and treats it with a measured and serious response. 
Fifth, the bright line standards now in effect neither offer adequate 
protection against determined redistricters, attorneys, and judges, nor do 
the standards inhibit judges from deciding that minorities are better off 
fractured. In his partial roncurrence and dissent in the two Jeffers v. 
Clinton cases, Judge G. Thomas Eisele repudiated an "ability to elect" 
140. ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES CouNT? AFFIRMAT IVE ACTION AND Ml· 
NORITY VOTING RIGHTS 9-10, 131-33, ISS, 196, 238-39, 242 (1987). 
141. On the variable nature of American racism, see DoNALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO 
KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CoNSTITUTlONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 
(1991); J . MORGAN KOUSSER, DEAD END: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH CENTURY 
LmGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ScHOOLS (1986); J. Morgan Kousser, Before 
Plessy, Before Brown: The Development of the Low of Racial lntegratton in LouiSiana and 
Kansas, in TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 213 (Paul 
Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991). 
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standard completely, 142 and when he grudgingly applied it, he applied it 
bizarrely. In one area in which blacks comprised 45% of the voting age 
population of a district, Eisele ruled this to be a minority-controlled dis-
trict without inquiring into registration, turnout, or cohesion levels, be-
cause 5% or more of the white voters usually crossed over to vote for a 
black candidate. By mechanically applying a strange interpretation of 
the Gingles test, Eisele denied blacks the practical ability to control elec-
tions. 143 In other places, two or more black areas that were close to-
gether, but had never been placed in the same electoral district before, 
were proposed to be joined to create black majority districts. Even 
though plaintiffs proved that black candidates usually lost in the areas 
because of white bloc voting, and that blacks in most of the parts of the 
districts had backed the same candidates in the past, Eisele still favored 
denying them relief because they could not show that the newly joined 
black communities would be politically cohesive with each other. 144 This 
amounts to a judicial "catch-22": to merit relief, one must demonstrate 
minority cohesion, but to demonstrate cohesion, one must first have ob-
tained relief. Thus, Eisele exploited the formalistic character of the Gin-
gles test to uphold the racial and political status quo. As it stands today, 
then, the Gingles test, if formulated adversely enough, can deprive minor-
ities even of "control" districts. 
Nor does Gingles stop judges from turning an "ability to elect" stan-
dard into something else. Immediately after quoting Gingles, Fifth Cir-
cuit Judge Thomas G. Gee in a 1988 case announced, without citing 
further case law, what might be called an "ability to compete" standard: 
"When we ask how far is far enough for courts to intervene in the polit-
ical process, we must ask whether any group is systematically prevented 
from competing and coalescing with other groups to produce a realistic 
possibility for electoral victory. If groups are not systematically impeded 
in competing, courts must not interfere in the game of politics."14s De-
spite the fact that the 21% black town of Oxford, Mississippi had never 
elected a black alderman, and that Mississippi had a notorious history of 
142. "What is required, what all must insist upon, is fair and equal opportunity for all to 
participate in the political process-nothing more, nothing less. That is what the Voting 
Rights Act and our Constitution require." Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585, 626 (E. D. Ark. 
1990) (Eisele, J ., dissenting). 
143. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 251-52 (E.D. Ark. 1989). Judge Eisele's mathe-
matics are as bad as his log:~c. If 5% of the 55% of the potential voters who are white joined 
the 45% of the voters who are black, the black-chosen candidate would get only 48% of the 
vote, not 50% ((.05 X .55 = .0275) + .45 = .4775). 
144. /d. at 269-77. 
145. Houston v. Haley, 859 F.2d 341, 348 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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racism (which Judge Gee dismissed by referring to "the irrelevant crite-
rion of race"), 1~ the judge ruled that a district that was 54% black in 
population-but surely much less in voting age population, registration, 
and turnout-was legal. Unless this standard were interpreted to mean 
an equal ability to compete, it is difficult to see how, under it, any electo-
ral structure could be invalidated under section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act or the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. 
Perhaps worst of all, the Republican majority on the 1991 Ohio 
State Apportionment Board formalistically and disingenuously inter-
preted the first prong of Gingles to require them to pack the maximum 
number of blacks into individual state assembly districts. 147 Completely 
disregarding a level of white crossover voting that in 1990 allowed seven 
of the eleven African-American state assemblypersons to be elected from 
districts in which less than a majority of the population was black-that 
is, considering the prongs of Gingles in isolation from each other-the 
Republicans employed Gingles in what two of three federal judges who 
heard the case recognized as an intentional effort to reduce the influence 
of black voters over the election of the legislature as a whole. No party 
to the case contended that race could not be taken into account, or that 
the state was not obliged to create districts in which black voters would 
have an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. The prob-
lem was the definition of "control!' The Republicans wanted judges to 
blind themselves to the political reality that in contemporary Ohio, a dis-
trict that is 35% black in population is extremely likely to elect the first 
choice of the black community, but, instead, to assume that Gingles dic-
tated a 50% standard. The result would be to "waste" the maximum 
number of black votes, thereby diminishing both black and Democratic 
power. In other words, the Republican goal of reducing Democratic in-
fluence could only be accomplished by reducing the influence of blacks 
(at least 85% of whom in Ohio regularly voted Democratic). That is, as 
has so often been the case in American history, racial and partisan mo-
tives were inextricably intertwined. 148 
146. /d. at 343 n.l. 
147. Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 699 (N.D. Ohio 1992); and Quilter v. Voi-
novich, 794 F. Supp. 7S6, 1S6-S1 (N.D. Ohio 1992). Further facts about this case will be 
drawn, without further citation, from these opinions and from the briefs and oral argument 
before the United States Supreme Court. See discussion of Supreme Court decision infra part 
V.F. 
148. See ]. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RE-
STRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SoUTH, 1880-1910 (1974). 
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F. A Unanimous Non-Decision 
In a short unanimous opinion in the Ohio apportionment case that 
left open most of the broadest questions, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor 
overturned the district court decision, sustaining the Republicans' ac-
tions without accepting their rationale. 149 The Voting Rights Act, 
O'Connor ruled, did not require the state to draw districts in which a 
minority group constituted a majority of the population (as Republicans 
had contended), but neither did it prohibit the state from doing so, unless 
critics of the apportionment proved that doing so would have a discrimi-
natory effect or that it was adopted with a discriminatory intent. The 
district court had erred by placing the burden of proof on the state, in-
stead of the plaintiffs, and the evidence of minority "packing" presented 
in the lower court's opinion was insufficient to prove a violation of the 
law.150 Even more serious was the lack of racial bloc voting demon-
strated on the record. In the district court, Judges Nathaniel R. Jones 
and John W. Peck had used the fact that there were substantial white 
crossover rates in state legislative races involving black candidates to ar-
gue that Republicans had knowingly and unnecessarily packed blacks. 
In contemporary Ohio, African-Americans could elect candidates of 
their choice in districts that contained much smaller percentages of black 
voters. lSI Yet the same facts proved to O'Connor that there was no ra-
cial bloc voting by whites, and thus, under the third prong of Gingles, no 
violation. 152 Furthermore, the eight Republican and one Democratic 
Justices found the district court's skimpy opinion on intentional discrimi-
nation unconvincing. The high court placed particular emphasis on the 
fact that the Ohio NAACP had endorsed the Republican plan.153 
On two larger questions, the Supreme Court specifically declined to 
rule. Defining influence districts as "districts in which black voters 
would not constitute a majority but in which they could, with the help of 
a predictable number of crossover votes from white voters, elect their 
candidates of choice," O'Connor assumed only "for the purpose of 
resolving this case" that such claims were cognizable under section 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act. But following Gingles, she did not actually de-
cide the issue. 154 Moreover, although during oral arguments Justice 
149. Voinovich v. Quilter, 61 U.S.L.W. 4199 (1993). 
150. /d. at 4202. 
151. Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 698 (N.D. Ohio 1992). 
152. Voinovich v. Quilter, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4203. 
153. /d. O'Connor's opinion largely ignored the more extensive evidence of racial intent 
in the brief of the counsel for the Democrats. See Appellees' Brief at 19-21, Voinovich v. 
Quilter, 61 U.S.L.W. 4199 (1993). 
!54. /d. at 4200-01. 
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Antonio Scalia had questioned whether race could be used as a criterion 
for drawing district lines at all unless a violation of the Voting Rights 
Act were first proven, neither the Democrats, nor the Republicans, nor 
the district court, nor the Justice Department had raised the issue. 
O'Connor therefore let it rest undecided for the moment. m 
By allowing influence district claims to ripen further and by not 
granting majority-minority districts as such any special status, O'Connor 
adopted an approach not inconsistent with the analysis in this Article. 
To be sure, the Justice treated the Gingles factors separately, but the fact-
oriented inquiry into allegations of racial packing that she briefly sug-
gested implies that they must be appraised together. Creating majority-
minority districts, she recognized, might or might not be discriminatory. 
"Which effect the practice has, if any at all, depends entirely on the facts 
and circumstances of each case."t~6 
This statement exposes perhaps the chief deficiency of the case 
presented by the Democrats and adopted by the majority of the district 
court-it did not provide enough facts about the non-packed districts. 
As one of the Justices remarked to the Democrats' attorney during oral 
argument, "really you should focus on the other districts to see if they're 
diluted, because the packing itself is not enough, as I understand your 
theory."m Blacks, after all, could control the packed districts. It was in 
the other districts and the state as a whole that their influence was re-
duced. Why was it reduced? Because in districts below 35% black, few 
or no black candidates had been elected-prima facie evidence of white 
racial bloc voting. Thus, more detailed attention to the districts not rep-
resented by black legislators would have gone a long way toward satisfy-
ing the third prong of Gingles, and it would have required consideration 
of all three parts of the test together. 
G. The Test of Tradition 
The discriminatory effect and intent approach outlined above ac-
cords with tradition, logic, and much, though not all, recent case law. 
As for tradition, the only period in which the courts and Congress ac-
cepted mechanistic, bright line tests was the period of massive discrimi-
nation and black disfranchisement. Conversely, during both 
I SS. Transcript of Oral Arguments before the Supreme Court in Yoinovich v. Quilter, at 
8-10, 17; Yoinovich v. Quilter, 61 U.S.L.W. 4199, 4202. I want to thank Jonathan Steinberg 
for providing me with the Transcript of Oral Argument. 
IS6. Yoinovich v. Quilter, 61 U.S.L.W. 4199, 4202 (1993). 
IS1. Transcript of Oral Argument before the Supreme Court in Voinovich v. Quilter, at 
43. 
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Reconstructions, which represented the high points of fervor for minor-
ity rights in American history, Congress and the courts were flexible and 
practical. As for logic and more recent history, it is clear that there is no 
mathematical threshold that sets off influence districts from control dis-
tricts, and that contemporary experience in actual elections mirrors the 
hypothetical world sketched above in Table 1. As for law, the most per-
suasive interpretation of Justice Brennan's prevailing opinion and Justice 
O'Connor's concurrence in Gingles is that the three prongs of the Gingles 
test ought to be considered as a unit, not separately. Subsequent lower 
court opinions that specifically consider the problem of influence districts 
either adopt tests like those proposed in this Article (Garza and Armour) 
or, through specious reasoning, deny minority communities that would 
have good chances to elect candidates of their choice the opportunity to 
do so (Springfield Park District). Fears of the consequences of the aban-
donment of bright line tests are not without merit, but on the whole, are 
unpersuasive. Even now, such standards can be circumvented or even 
employed to undermine minority political potency. If the object of vot-
ing rights litigation generally is to fulfill the promise of Carolene Prod-
ucts, Iss to make sure that the political process is fair and honest and that 
minority groups do not suffer at the hands of majorities, then courts must 
intervene to prohibit discrimination in the electoral process against 
small, as well as large groups. 
158. United States v. Caro1ene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
